Government-Owned Enterprises in Canada by Crisan, Daria & McKenzie, Kenneth J.
www.pol icyschool.ca
Volume 6•Issue 8• February 2013
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SUMMARY
Until now, assessments of the scope of enterprises in Canada that are owned by government
have placed Canada roughly in the middle of OECD member countries in terms of how much
direct control governments have over businesses in our economy. But that’s because all of
those assessments have relied almost strictly on counting federal Crown corporations. For the
first time, this study takes into account businesses owned by lower levels of governments. And
once they are accounted for, it becomes clear that the size of Canada’s state-owned enterprise
(SOE) sector is dramatically bigger than previously thought. In fact, the provincial Crown sector
alone is significantly larger than the entire federal sector, whether we measure by assets,
employees or contribution to national GDP. 
Add the assets of provincial Crown corporations to the federal ones and the combined sector
turns out to be nearly two and a half times larger than the federal sector alone. Measured by
contribution to GDP, the provincial sector and federal sector together account for nearly five
times as much as the federal sector on its own.
But even this seriously understates the true scope of government-owned enterprise in Canada,
since it does not account for what are certainly hundreds more municipally owned
corporations. Getting a handle on the actual size of the undoubtedly substantial municipal-
SOE sector, however, has proven to be difficult, due to the dispersion of records and the
differences in how government-affiliated businesses are structured and defined from city to
city (and even within the same city). But one thing is certain: Canadian governments own a
sizeably larger share of the national economy than past studies have suggested.
The share of the economy that is controlled by government is something Canadians need to
have a much clearer idea about: In the past, Canadian governments have privatized many of
the most visible state-owned businesses, from Air Canada and Petro-Canada at the federal
level, to Manitoba Telephone Systems and Nova Scotia Power Corp. at the provincial level.
With a better understanding of the size, and structure, of the government-owned enterprise
sector, Canadians may wonder if there is still much more room for privatization. It is possible
that may not be the case. But until Canadians have clear information about the government’s
ownership stake in the economy, informed decisions about the further privatization of Crown
corporations are not possible.
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to compile an inventory of Crown corporations or, more generally,
government-owned enterprises, at the federal and provincial level in Canada. 
Most previous studies of the size of the Crown sector, in Canada and elsewhere, focus on the
federal government. There is no other study that we are aware of that looks at the provincial
Crown sector in the level of detail achieved here. As will be illustrated, a key insight from this
analysis is that Canadian provincial governments own a significant number of corporations in a
variety of sectors and, in fact, the provincial Crown corporation presence exceeds the federal
presence along several dimensions. Previous studies based on a subset of federal Crown
corporations are thus misleading and may be considered an underrepresentation of the scope of
government-owned enterprises in Canada.
This is primarily an exercise in data gathering and presentation. While we offer some metrics
that may be thought of as meaningful inputs into a discussion of the scope for privatization, the
merits of privatization need to be considered on a case-by-case basis using a host of other
metrics and incorporating many issues that are beyond the scope of this paper; we undertake no
such analysis here.1
2. DEFINING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
The objective of our inventory is to document the extent of government involvement in the
market through state-owned enterprises. It turns out that this is no small task. The biggest
problem in compiling a comprehensive list of such entities is definitional, specifically the
variety of designations used to identify and describe government enterprises. Besides “Crown
corporations” and “state-owned enterprises,” other labels we have encountered include:
government-owned corporation, state-owned company, state-owned entity, state enterprise,
publicly owned corporation, government business enterprise, and many others. This variety of
designations, combined with the lack of a uniform definition, is one of the main challenges that
we encountered during this data-collection exercise. 
Statistics Canada, through CANSIM, publishes a series of statistics on government business
enterprises (GBE) in Canada at the federal, provincial and local level, which we review below.
One of the criteria for an entity to qualify as a GBE in the CANSIM database is that at least 50
per cent of its revenue comes from “market activities” in a given year. This substantially
narrows the list of GBEs. One difficulty with this is that the 50-per-cent cut-off is arbitrary and
the definition of “market activities” is subjective. For example, there may well be sizable parts
of government enterprises that might be considered as possible candidates for privatization even
though the enterprise as a whole does not meet the 50-per-cent threshold. As such, we have
chosen to develop a broader and more comprehensive list.
1 For a discussion see: Anthony E. Boardman and Aidan R. Vining, “A Review and Assessment of Privatization in
Canada,” University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy Research Papers 5, 4 (2012). 
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Obtaining data on federal Crown corporations is relatively straightforward. The primary source
is the Annual Report to Parliament on Crown Corporations and Other Corporate Interests.
This provides a list of all of the federal Crown corporations as well as aggregate data on a
subset of Crown corporations. With this list in hand, it is relatively easy to access the annual
reports of the listed corporations and acquire the relevant financial data.
Provinces pose more of a problem. There are several difficulties. One is that very few
provinces have a document similar to the federal government’s Annual Report to Parliament
that provides a comprehensive list of provincially owned enterprises. In some provinces this is
not a problem because other documents serve a similar purpose. For example, in
Saskatchewan, the Crown Investments Corporation is the holding company of the province’s
commercial Crown corporations, and obtaining a list of provincial Crown corporations and
their financial data is a relatively straightforward matter.2 In the other provinces this is not the
case, and there is no single repository or list of Crown corporations. The primary approach in
this case is to use provincial public accounts to identify Crown entities and then access the
relevant annual reports.
Moreover, at the provincial level the distinction between entities identified as Crown
corporations versus other government entities is not at all clear. This makes it difficult to
follow a consistent definition of a Crown corporation across the provinces. Also, in some
cases, it is clear from the documents that some government entities that are technically not
Crown corporations do effectively act as such — they are de facto Crown corporations. 
For example, in Alberta’s Financial Administration Act, a distinction is made between Crown-
controlled organizations and departments — where Crown-controlled organizations include “an
unincorporated board, commission, council or other body that is not a department or part of a
department” — as well as corporations where the Crown owns a majority of the issued voting
shares, and corporations that are “responsible for the administration of public money or assets
owned by the Crown” and where the Crown names some of the directors.
On the other hand, the Public Appointments Secretariat of Ontario prefers the designation
“agency”: “Many terms are used to describe different kinds of classified agencies and non-
classified entities — boards, commissions, councils, authorities and foundations. All of these
bodies are referred to as agencies on this site.”3 According to the definition, “a classified
agency is a provincial government organization: 
• which is established by the government, but is not part of a ministry;
• which is accountable to the government;
• to which the government appoints the majority of the appointees; and 
• to which the government has assigned or delegated authority and responsibility, or which
otherwise has statutory authority and responsibility to perform a public function or service.”
2 However, the Crown Investment Corporation of Saskatchewan holds only nine of the provincial Crown corporations.
In addition, there are 10 Treasury Board Crown Corporations, plus the Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board,
which defines itself as a government business enterprise.
3 Government of Ontario, Public Appointments Secretariat, “General Information,” accessed March 30, 2012,
http://www.pas.gov.on.ca/scripts/en/generalInfo.asp.
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3The secretariat distinguishes between advisory agencies, regulatory agencies, adjudicative
agencies, operational service agencies, operational enterprise agencies, Crown foundations,
trust agencies, and non-classified entities. Operational enterprise agencies, which “sell goods or
services to the public in a commercial manner (including, but not necessarily, in competition
with the private sector)” are closest to the profile of Crown corporations that we have adopted.
Therefore there are government-owned entities that include the designation “corporation” in
their name but define themselves as an “agency” (operational enterprise agency), such as the
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario, Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation and
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation. Others, such as the Liquor Control Board of Ontario,
but also the Manitoba Liquor Control Commission and the Newfoundland and Labrador
Municipal Financing Corporation, define themselves both as “Crown agency” or “Crown
corporation,” and “government enterprise” at various times, with the terms seemingly used
interchangeably.
Yet another example of the definitional difficulties can be seen with entities such as the Ontario
Lottery and Gaming Corporation, PEI Aquaculture and Fisheries Research Initiative Inc.,
Hydro One Inc., Ontario Power Generation, BC Ferries, etc. Even though these entities are not
defined as Crown corporations directly, they are wholly owned by the provincial government
and act as de facto Crown corporations.
Our inventory thus includes all government-owned enterprises that we were able to identify at
the federal and provincial level and a few such entities at the municipal level, that are involved
in market activities, very broadly defined. They may or may not identify themselves as Crown
corporations or government business enterprises explicitly, and some of them may also have
regulatory attributes, aside from their involvement in commercial activities (such as the
provincial liquor control commissions). For simplicity’s sake, we use the designation “Crown
corporation” for all these entities, but wherever possible we have included their actual
designation(s) in Appendix A. 
As indicated, our objective is to be as comprehensive and as broad as possible, and if we have
erred, it is likely on the side of being overly inclusive.
3. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE SIZE OF THE GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
SECTOR
A recent OECD study, “The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries,”
documents the size of the national state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in 27 of the 34 OECD
countries in terms of number, employment and economic value of enterprises, as well as by
main sectors and types of incorporation. The study reports that even after decades of
privatization, the SOE sector in most countries is significant and displays a strong sectoral
concentration, with the largest SOEs located in the so-called “network” sectors (mostly
transportation, power generation and other energy), as well as in the financial sector. 
The OECD study places Canada in the “middle of the pack” in terms of the size of the SOE
sector for the countries examined, with 33 SOEs, 105,296 employees and a US$21.6 billion
market value. By way of comparison, the Czech Republic has 124 SOEs, with 166,600
employees and a US$43.9 billion market value, while Australia has 17 SOEs that employ
48,845 people and have a combined market value of US$17.6 billion.
However, the OECD study includes only enterprises owned by the federal government, and the
figures are based on aggregate government business enterprise (GBE) statistics reported by
Statistics Canada’s Public Sector Statistics Division.
Statistics Canada collects and publishes data on the government sector as well as government
business enterprises (GBE). According to the “Financial Management System (FMS) 2009
Catalogue no. 68F0023 X” page 14:
“3.03 Government business enterprises are part of the public sector domain because
they are controlled by governments. However, they operate in the market place,
often in competition with privately owned organizations. Since they are profit-
oriented entities, they must be included in the sectors that reflect their primary
economic activity.” 
In order to determine whether a government-controlled entity qualifies as a GBE or not,
Statistics Canada follows a classification process using three criteria:
“3.04 A classification process is necessary in order to determine whether or not an
entity belongs in the public sector universe. This process involves analysing and
documenting the legal and operating structures, financial performance and activities
of the entity in question. There are three criteria used to assess an entity for
potential inclusion in the public sector universe:
•  Is the entity an institutional unit?
•  Is the entity controlled by a government?
•  Is the entity a non-market or market producer of goods and services?”
Finally, the characteristics used by Statistics Canada to determine whether an entity is a GBE
are as follows:
“Most market producers are profit-oriented organizations. They are institutional
units that provide goods and/or services in the open market at prices that are
economically significant. The majority of these organizations are financially self-
sufficient and generally do not rely on public funds to support their operations.
Since they usually compete with other providers of similar goods and services, the
public has free choice in their market selection. All institutional units that are
government controlled market producers are classified as public non-financial or
financial corporations in either the non-financial corporations sector or the financial
corporations sector. The following indicators are used in this determination process:
•  The entity has the financial and operational authority to carry on a business.
•  The entity competes in the marketplace.
•  The public has free choice to acquire or reject the good or service.
•  The entity charges prices that are economically significant.
•  The entity gets its primary income from market activity.
•  The entity can borrow autonomously.
•  The entity remits profits and/or dividends to a government.
•  The entity's employees do not negotiate collective agreements with a      
government.”
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GBEs are therefore profit-oriented entities that compete in the marketplace alongside private
agents. Where a government-owned entity relies on market revenues as well as government
subsidies, the rule of thumb used by Statistics Canada to decide whether this entity should be
considered a GBE is if more than 50 per cent of its revenue derives from market activities. 
To collect financial data on GBEs, Statistics Canada follows a similar approach to the one we
have followed here, using the annual financial reports published by each GBE, as well as
Public Accounts publications:
“Government business enterprise data
4.06 Revenue, expenditures, assets and liabilities data on federal, provincial and
territorial business enterprises required for FMS statistics are obtained from the
financial reports of these enterprises. Additional information is obtained from the
PA, from reports of the departments through which the enterprises report to their
legislature and through direct communication with the enterprises.
4.07 While data on local government enterprise finance are not published at present,
financial reports of many of these enterprises are being received with those of their
parent municipalities. In addition, selected and usually highly aggregated financial
data are collected by other divisions of StatCan such as the Transportation Division
(public transit systems) and the Manufacturing, Construction and Energy Division
(Hydro-electric and gas distribution)”
We have compiled a summary of the financial information published by CANSIM for GBEs at
the federal, provincial/territorial and local/municipal level. Only aggregate data are available,
so we are missing important information about each individual GBE, and also about the
distribution of GBEs across sectors. Moreover, the 50-per-cent cutoff and the narrow definition
of market activities significantly narrow the scope of the data. Nonetheless, the data provide a
useful starting point for our analysis.
TABLE 1. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, ALL INDUSTRIES- 2010 ($MILLIONS)
Source: CANSIM Table 3850030 – Balance sheet and income statement of federal government business enterprises, 
by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), end of fiscal year closest to December 31, annually. 
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299,342.8 271,712.3 27,630.5 30,509.2 22,397.5 (822.0) 7,646.0 
Total Total Equity Total Total Gains or losses, Comprehensive
assets liabilities revenue expenses corporate income
taxes and
other items
TABLE 2. PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, ALL INDUSTRIES- 2010 ($MILLIONS)
Source: CANSIM Table 3850031 – Balance sheet and income statement of provincial and territorial government business
enterprises, by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), end of fiscal year closest to December 31,
annually.
TABLE 3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, ALL INDUSTRIES- 2009 ($MILLIONS)
Source: CANSIM Table 3850015 – Income and expenses of provincial, territorial and local government business enterprises, by
industry, end of the fiscal year closest to December 31, annually.
As the data illustrate, federal and provincial/territorial GBEs are about equal in magnitude in
terms of gross assets: $299.3 billion for federal versus $287.4 for provincial. However, in terms
of net assets or equity, provincial GBEs are, in aggregate, much larger than federal GBEs:
$45.4 billion versus $27.6 billion. Data on the assets, liabilities and equity of local/municipal
GBEs are not available on CANSIM.
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Canada 287,385.8 242,025.5 45,360.3 85,448.0 67,192.7 467.0 18,422.1 
Newfoundland 3,079.0 1,743.1 1,335.8 1,144.1 889.1 (1.0) 259.3
and Labrador 
Prince Edward Island 122.2 106.7 15.4 149.4 119.7 (1.2) 28.5 
Nova Scotia 1,896.5 1,740.4 156.1 1,105.4 800.6 68.8 373.6 
New Brunswick 10,400.5 10,147.5 253.0 2,663.1 2,341.9 (15.1) 178.2 
Quebec 101,104.2 80,377.2 20,727.0 20,922.6 16,624.8 225.3 4,158.1 
Ontario 73,355.0 68,284.4 5,070.6 27,126.6 21,465.1 150.5 5,767.0 
Manitoba 17,495.7 14,164.2 3,331.4 4,561.1 3,531.7 (1.5) 1,171.0 
Saskatchewan 12,288.8 8,480.8 3,808.0 6,705.5 5,656.1 (29.0) 1,040.0 
Alberta 28,009.5 25,798.5 2,211.0 5,963.6 3,614.0 34.3 2,339.7 
British Columbia 38,654.4 30,418.2 8,236.2 14,777.3 11,864.8 36.9 3,060.8 
Yukon 391.9 324.4 67.6 73.9 59.0 -  14.9 
Northwest Territories 397.4 294.9 102.5 154.6 120.5 -  36.2 
Nunavut 190.8 145.2 45.6 100.8 105.4 (0.8) (5.3) 
Gains/
Total Total Equity Total Total losses, Comprehensive
assets liabilities revenue expenses corporate income
taxes and
other items
Canada 21,429.1 20,450.3 978.8 202.0 776.8
Newfoundland and Labrador 14.1 14.1 -  -  -  
Prince Edward Island 21.7 21.8 (0.0) -  (0.0)
Nova Scotia 90.9 90.0 0.9 -  0.9 
New Brunswick 149.6 143.5 6.2 -  6.2 
Quebec 1,977.0 1,882.0 95.0 -  95.0 
Ontario 11,106.7 10,706.2 400.5 101.2 299.3 
Manitoba 139.6 122.4 17.2 -  17.2 
Saskatchewan 189.2 157.9 31.3 -  31.3 
Alberta 6,607.3 6,102.3 504.9 100.8 404.1 
British Columbia 1,130.8 1,207.9 (77.1) -  (77.1)
Yukon 2.2 2.2 0.0 -  0.0 
Total Total Net income Provision Net income
income Expenses (loss) before for (loss) after
provision for income tax provision for
income tax income tax
7In terms of financial results, with $85.4 billion in revenue, provincial GBEs dominate federal
GBEs, with only $30.5 billion, as well as the local GBEs with $21.4 billion in revenue.
Regarding comprehensive income, provincial GBEs have a total combined $18.4 billion in net
income, with the federal GBEs at $7.6 billion and local enterprises much lower at $776.8
million.
In terms of provincial magnitudes, the largest GBE sector as measured by gross assets is found
in Quebec, followed by Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. For comprehensive income, the
ranking is Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta. At the local level, however, Alberta
dominates the universe of GBEs, with $404.1 million in net income, more than half the total of
$776.8 million for all of Canada. The municipally owned power companies of ENMAX4 and
EPCOR5 generate more than 50 per cent of this income.6 Ontario comes in a distant second at
the local level, with only $299.3 million in net income generated by municipal GBEs.
As indicated previously, Statistics Canada’s designation of a government business enterprise is
quite narrow. Our database extends the analysis by:
• Extending the definition of state-owned enterprises/Crown corporations beyond what
Statistics Canada defines as a GBE;
• Including federal, provincial, and some municipal Crown corporations, and comparisons
between the relative size of each of these levels of government;
• Providing financial data for individual SOEs alongside provincial and sectoral aggregates.
4. FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS
The business of the government of Canada is conducted through a wide variety of institutional
and organizational forms. At the federal level, these institutional forms, and the associated roles
and responsibilities, are for the most part listed and governed by the Financial Administration
Act (FAA) and its accompanying schedules. In analyzing public-owned enterprises and Crown
corporations, it is useful to begin by listing the various types of “public entities” and
organizational forms at the federal level in Canada, and briefly discussing their status and
accountability.
4 ENMAX Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the City of Calgary
5 EPCOR Utilities Inc. has the City of Edmonton as sole shareholder 
6 For the financial year ending Dec. 31, 2010, ENMAX and EPCOR report net incomes of $178 million and $105
million respectively, and comprehensive income of $162.5 million and $98 million respectively.
Organizational Forms at the Federal Level
DEPARTMENTS
Ministerial departments are the main vehicles through which government programs are
delivered. Departments are established by legislation and their roles and responsibilities are
listed in Schedule One of the FAA. Departments typically have broad policy mandates under
the control of the designated minister, are entirely accountable to Parliament and, as such, have
no “independent legal personality.” They are financed almost exclusively by parliamentary
appropriations. Examples include the Department of Finance, Industry Canada, Foreign Affairs
and International Trade Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, etc.
SPECIAL OPERATING AGENCIES
Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) are operational units within departments that have some
independence and separate accountability. They are typically formed without legislation and
function within a framework agreed to by the responsible minister and the Treasury Board.
SOAs are accountable to the government via the responsible department, typically have a very
clear operational mandate, and deliver a readily identifiable service. They are considered part
of the host department and not a separate legal entity. An example of an SOA is Passport
Canada, which operates within Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.
STATUTORY AND OTHER AGENCIES
Statutory and Other Agencies, like SOAs, operate as a part of departmental ministry, typically
within a narrowly defined mandate. A Statutory Agency differs from a SOA, however, in that it
will have a legislative origin (typically one is formed by statute or by an order-in-council), and
can operate with some autonomy and at some “distance” from government and the department
to which it is responsible. The degree of this autonomy varies, depending upon the need for the
agency to be seen to be free from ministerial influence. As such, some Statutory and Other
Agencies are financed by separate parliamentary appropriations. An example of a Statutory and
Other Agency is Statistics Canada, which reports to Parliament through Industry Canada.
AGENTS OF PARLIAMENT
Agents of Parliament are a special group of independent officers whose primary responsibility
is to scrutinize the activities of the government and provide parliamentary oversight. As such,
they report directly to Parliament and not to an individual minister. Importantly, the degree of
influence exercised by the executive on Agents of Parliament is minimal. An example of an
Agent of Parliament is the auditor general.
DEPARTMENTAL CORPORATIONS
Departmental Corporations are created by acts of Parliament and are listed under Schedule Two
of the FAA. While they report to Parliament through a ministry, they typically operate with a
greater degree of autonomy than do core line departments. Departmental Corporations typically
undertake specific service, administrative, advisory, supervisory, regulatory or research
functions. They are financed largely through parliamentary appropriations, though in some
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cases they also collect user fees. They are typically governed by some sort of management
board or governing council. An example of a Departmental Corporation is the National
Research Council, which reports to Parliament through Industry Canada.
A special type of Departmental Corporation is a Service Agency. Service Agencies are
established through legislation and are distinct in that they perform a highly operational
function or service for which there is usually no private-sector competition. Service Agencies
are financed through parliamentary appropriations and user fees. An example of a Service
Agency is the Canada Revenue Agency.
CROWN CORPORATIONS
The focus of this paper is, of course, on Crown corporations. Crown corporations operate
largely on a private-sector model, and indeed they may have a mixture of commercial and
public-policy objectives. Parent Crown corporations are directly owned by the government of
Canada and are established through legislation, letters patent, or articles of incorporation under
the Canada Business Corporations Act. Most Crown corporations are listed and described in
Section Three of the FAA, however some have their own legislation (e.g., the Bank of
Canada). Crown corporations are generally designated as being under the purview of a
particular ministerial portfolio.
Crown corporations may receive parliamentary appropriations and may also generate their own
revenue by way of their private-sector operations. Some Crown corporations return income to
the government by way of dividends.
Crown corporations may, in turn, own subsidiary corporations, in whole or in part. Subsidiary
corporations typically report to their Crown parent, and not directly to Parliament. There are
some exceptions to this, whereby wholly owned subsidiaries are deemed to be parent Crowns
and report directly to Parliament.
Crown corporations are designated as either an agent of the Crown, a non-agent of the Crown,
or a partial agent of the Crown. The agency status of a Crown corporation can be very
important, and is discussed next.
AGENT VS. NON-AGENT CROWN CORPORATIONS
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat indicates that “a Crown corporation that has agent
status enjoys the constitutional immunities, privileges and prerogatives that are enjoyed by the
Crown and can bind the Crown by its acts.”7
Agent status on the part of a Crown corporation means that not only does the corporation enjoy
the immunities, privileges and prerogatives of the Crown, but that the Crown is fully liable for
the actions and decisions of the corporation while the corporation is operating within its mandate.
This includes financial activities. As such, the assets, liabilities and financial obligations of the
corporation are the assets, liabilities and financial obligations of the government.
7 From Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Agent Status and Crown Corporations, at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/gov-
gouv/agent-mandataire/agent-mandataire-eng.asp
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Non-agent Crown corporations, on the other hand, enjoy no such protection, nor is the
government legally responsible for the specific actions of the corporation, unless the
corporation acts under the explicit direction of the Crown. Of course the government may bear
some sort of “moral obligation” for the activities of a non-agent corporation, but this remains at
the discretion of the government.
A Crown corporation has partial agency status if it has agency status for some purposes and
non-agency status for others. The Bank of Canada, for example, is designated as an agent for
fiscal purposes only. This means, for example, that if the bank is involved in a private-sector
contract (e.g., the construction of a building), the contract would not bind the Crown. On the
other hand, if the bank, say, transacts in foreign exchange markets, it would be acting as an
agent of the government and the Crown would be legally bound by the bank’s actions.
Similarly, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) is an agent of the Crown
except for its activities involved in the establishment of branches and the employment of
agents. This means that agents employed by CMHC are not agents of the Crown.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY STATUS
Perhaps one of the most important potential benefits of Crown corporation agency status is the
technical immunity from taxation. The legal implications of agency status with regard to
taxation follows not only from common law and the statutory rules relating to Crown agency,
but also from section 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867. The Constitution states that each level
of government is immune from taxation by the other, and this immunity extends to Crown
corporations designated as agents of those governments.
As such, a significant “benefit” of agency status for a Crown corporation is that, in principle, it
doesn’t have to pay federal, provincial or municipal taxes. However, in practice, this immunity
is not as advantageous as it may appear. For example, for federal Crown corporations the
immunity from provincial and municipal taxes and fees is neutralized to some extent by the
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act and the Payments in Lieu of Taxes Act. Under
these acts, Crown corporations with agency status voluntarily pay the equivalent of provincial
and municipal taxes and fees (with the important exception of provincial corporate income
taxes) that would normally be paid by non-agents of the Crown. 
With respect to income tax, the government can voluntarily decide to make a Crown
corporation with agency status pay corporate income taxes. At the federal level this is done by
the governor-in-council upon the recommendation of the minister of finance. A federal agent
Crown corporation that is made subject to corporate income tax pays the applicable federal
corporate income tax and, in place of provincial income tax, pays an additional 10 per cent
federal corporate income tax. Note that the payment in lieu of provincial income taxes is made
at a 10 per cent rate, and not at the actual provincial tax rate(s).
As suggested above, Crown corporations with non-agency status are fully subject to all federal,
provincial and municipal taxes and fees (including corporate income tax), much like any private-
sector corporation. Removing agency status is thus the most straightforward way of removing the
tax immunity of Crown corporations. This approach was used by the province of British
Columbia, for example, to eliminate the tax-exempt status of the BC Ferry Corporation in 2003.
The (full or partial) immunity from taxation may be thought to confer a competitive advantage
to the extent that Crown corporations compete on a commercial basis with private-sector
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companies. Moreover, the tax exemption creates an incentive for one level of government to
take over private corporations in order to appropriate the tax revenues that would have accrued
to the other level of government.
Federal Crown Corporations: The Data
The Annual Report to Parliament – Crown Corporations and Other Corporate Interests of
Canada 2010 lists 48 federal Crown corporations. One of these, the Corporation for the
Mitigation of Mackenzie Gas Project Impacts, has been non-operational since May 1, 2008,8
and as such, has been excluded from our database. Three other Crown corporations — the
Bank of Canada (BC), the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), and the Public
Sector Pension Investment Board (PSPIB) — clearly serve unique purposes. Therefore for the
remainder of this study, the analysis of federal Crown corporations excludes BC, CPPIB and
PSPIB. However, for the sake of comparison, Tables 4A and 4B below include side-by-side the
aggregate financial and economic indicators for both groups: the 44 corporations of interest to
us, as well as the comprehensive group of 47 federal Crown corporations.9, 10 It is obvious that
the three unique financial Crown corporations mentioned above dominate the federal Crown
corporations sector in terms of assets and revenue. A complete listing of the individual federal
Crown corporations and the underlying data is available as Appendix A on The School of
Public Policy web site at http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/research-data. 
TABLE 4A. FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS — SUMMARY (IN $MILLIONS, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED)
*   Excluding BC, CPPIB and PSPIB
** Including BC, CPPIB and PSPIB
TABLE 4B. FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS — SUMMARY (CONT.)
*   Excluding BC, CPPIB and PSPIB
** Including BC, CPPIB and PSPIB
8 From Parliament of Canada, “Heads of Crown Corporations,” accessed April 20, 2012,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/compilations/FederalGovernment/CrownCorporation.aspx.
9 Also, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, it may not be appropriate to aggregate some of the financial
information due to differences in accounting treatments. We ignore these complications here for no justifiable reason
other than that we think that the figures give a relatively accurate picture of the federal Crown sector. 
10 Income Taxes, Employment, and Dividends data are taken from Annual Report to Parliament – Crown Corporations
and Other Corporate Interests of Canada 2010. The remaining data are collected from the 2009–2010 or 2010–2011
annual report of each corporation, with the exception of the First Nations Statistical Institute (FNSI) where the data
are collected from the FNSI’s third-quarter financial report for 2011.
Total * 44 386,176.3 353,591.5 32,079.7 28,512.8 30,251.3 -1,738.5
Total** 47 636,434.8 429,820.0 206,109.7 53,879.0 30,970.2 22,908.8
Number Assets Liabilities Equity/ Revenue Expenses Net Income
of units Deficit from from from
Operations Operations Operations
Total * 7,062.4 778.0 4,568.0 89,810.0 126.9 11,751 0.7% 11,316
Total** 7,062.4 778.0 29,215.4 90,376.0 126.9 36,804 2.3% 18,649
Public Income Net Income Employment Dividends GDP GDP Assets per
funding Taxes After Tax (units) contribution contribution capita ($)
(%)
During the fiscal year ending in 2010, the 44 federal Crown corporations held $386.2 billion in
assets, with total liabilities of $353.6 billion and equity of $32.1 billion.11 Aggregate revenue
from operations was $28.5 billion, and expenses from operation were $30.3 billion, yielding a
net loss of $1.7 billion in aggregate before parliamentary appropriations and other government
funding. Parliamentary appropriations and government funding for federal Crown corporations
amounted to $7.1 billion. In aggregate, the federal Crown corporations returned $126.9 million
in dividends to the federal government in 2010, and employed 89,810 individuals.
The vast bulk of the assets of federal Crown corporations are held by corporations involved in
the financial sector. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation holds almost 76 per cent
of all Crown corporation assets, followed by Export Development Canada (8.3 per cent), Farm
Credit Canada (5.2 per cent) and the Business Development Bank (4.6 per cent). In total, these
four corporations thus account for 94 per cent of federal Crown Corporation assets.
In 2010, 16 of the 44 federal Crown corporations generated positive net income before
government funding. Again, the corporations operating in the financial sector are very
important here, with Export Development Canada earning by far the most of any Crown
corporation, at $1.531 billion. Other high-income earners include the Canada Development
Investment Corporation ($816 million), Canada Post ($357 million), and Farm Credit Canada
($282 million). Of the Crown corporations recording net losses, the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation (CBC) leads the way with a net loss of $1.223 billion, followed by Atomic Energy
of Canada Limited (AECL, at $780 million), the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
($733 million) and the Canadian Air Transportation Security Authority ($574 million).12 Not
surprisingly, these four corporations also lead the way in receiving the most government
funding: the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation received $3.155 billion in funding,
followed by the CBC at $1.143 billion, Atomic Energy at $700 million, and the Canadian Air
Transportation Security Authority at $580 million. Thus, these four corporations account for
79 per cent of the total $7.062 billion federal government funding for Crown corporations.
In terms of employment, by far the biggest Crown-corporation employer is Canada Post, with
60,126 employees, representing 67 per cent of total federal Crown-corporation employment. It
is followed by the CBC (7,171), Atomic Energy (4,957), Via Rail (3,053), the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (1,999), the Business Development Bank (1,861), the Farm
Credit Corporation (1,642), and Export Development Canada (1,111). These eight corporations
thus account for 90 per cent of total federal Crown corporation employment.
In terms of size (assets), while there are 44 federal Crown corporations, most of the “action”
involves 10 corporations — or nine, if the soon-to-be-privatized AECL is omitted. Of these
corporations, most operate in the financial sector. Exceptions to this include the CBC, Canada
Post, Via Rail, and the aforementioned AECL.
11 Some corporations report net assets or equity that do not coincide with the difference between their assets and
liabilities; as a result, the aggregate figure for net assets/equity is not identical to the difference between assets and
liabilities. 
12 In 2009, the federal government announced that it intended to privatize AECL’s commercial-reactor business (the
Candu reactor division). In June 2011, it was announced that SNC-Lavalin purchased the business for $15 million.
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5. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT-OWNED ENTERPRISES
There are 181 government-owned enterprises included in our provincial database,13 ranging
from 25 in Quebec, to only 10 in Manitoba and New Brunswick.
As indicated previously, identifying provincial Crown corporations poses some challenges. An
example is the categorization of provincial workers’ compensation boards/commissions
(WCB). These are insurance institutions providing mutual accident insurance to workers and
employers, whereby injured workers are compensated for lost employment income and are
provided health services, while employers are shielded from litigation alleging negligence.
Each province and territory has a workers’ compensation board or commission (WCB). Some
of them identify themselves as Crown corporations (New Brunswick), others define themselves
as independent from the government in some context, but upon closer inspection appear to be a
statutory agency or corporation (British Columbia, Ontario). Similarly, the WCB of
Saskatchewan identifies itself as an “independent body” that is “financially independent of
government and special-interest groups.”14 However, its 2010 annual report specifies that:
“WCB is a Government Business Enterprise (GBE) and as such is exempt from income tax.”15
The WCB of Prince Edward Island defines itself as an “independent, non-profit organization,”
but it is also listed in the “Public Accounts of the Province of Prince Edward Island Volume II”
under “Agencies, Boards and Crown Corporations.” The only provincial WCB that appears to
be entirely independent from the provincial government is the one in Alberta.
For comparison purposes, WCBs, with the exception of Alberta’s, have been included in the
provincial tables with their financial details. The WCB in Alberta has not been included in the
provincial aggregate numbers, since it is explicitly identified as not being a government
institution: “The Workers’ Compensation Board – Alberta is an independent organization that
manages workers’ compensation insurance based on legislation. WCB–Alberta is not a
provincial government department or Crown corporation.”16
The financial information for the majority of provincial Crown corporations was extracted
from their most recent audited financial statements, available online either independently or as
part of their annual reports. The only exceptions were some of the Crown corporations of
Prince Edward Island, which do not publish their financial statements on their website; these
were retrieved from the “Public Accounts of the Province of Prince Edward Island Volume II.”
13 Excluding the Crown Investments Corporation of Saskatchewan, which is an umbrella corporation for nine Crown
corporations that we have listed separately, as well as the Workers’ Compensation Board in Alberta, which is not a
Crown corporation. Also, for two recently created provincial Crown corporations we have not been able to collect
any financial data (the Research and Development Corporation of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Economic
and Social Inclusion Corporation in New Brunswick, established in 2009 and 2010, respectively).
14 Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board , “Legislation,” accessed March 30, 2012,
http://www.wcbsask.com/WCBPortalWeb/appmanager/WCBPortalWeb/WCBPortalWeb?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=bo
ok_about_wcb.
15 Saskatchewan Workers’ Compensation Board, Annual Report 2011, page 50.
16 Workers’ Compensation Board – Alberta, “Who we are and what we do,” accessed April 10, 2012,
http://www.wcb.ab.ca/public/about_us.asp.
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We found it surprisingly difficult to collect the number of employees for provincial Crown
corporations. In some cases, employment numbers are available from the corporations’
websites or their annual reports, but in most cases, this information is not provided.
Employment numbers are provided where we could find them, but should be considered
incomplete. 
Along with raw financial information, we measure the relative magnitude of the provincial
Crown corporation sector in two ways. First, we calculate the contribution of the Crown
corporations to provincial GDP. Ideally this would involve a determination of the value-added
of each corporation, determined as the value of their output minus the value of their inputs.
This proved to be a difficult task given the nature of output that some of these corporations
provide. Our approach was instead to approximate the value added by each corporation by their
“profit” (net income), if positive, plus wages and professional expenses. We also measure the
relative size of the provincial Crown sectors by calculating assets per capita.
Some caveats and clarifications are in order for the interpretation of the data, particularly with
respect to interprovincial comparisons. The first is alluded to above: there is some degree of
arbitrariness in designating various agencies and institutions within provincial governments as
government-owned enterprises, or Crown corporations. As discussed, we have opted for a very
inclusive approach. The second concerns the various ways that government activities can be
organized. In some cases, the type of organizational form is dictated by the nature of the
activity. For example, regulatory and policy analysis should naturally be done at the
departmental level, while activities where governments compete directly with the private sector
should naturally be done via a Crown corporation. In other cases, however, it is not as
straightforward, and different governments may undertake similar activities by way of different
organizational forms. In these cases, the history of the province (“it has always been done this
way”), legal and political constraints unique to the province, etc. will dictate whether a
particular service or activity is conducted through a government-owned enterprise or by way of
a department or agency that is not included in our data set. This means that the size of the
Crown sector should not be interpreted as a measure of the degree of government intervention
or participation in the economy — as indicated, some provinces may choose to provide similar
services through different organizational forms. Rather, it is a measure of the extent to which
the province chooses to organize its activities in a particular way. This is particularly important
in making interprovincial comparisons. Our broad interpretation of a government-owned entity
blunts, but does not completely eliminate, this issue. This is important to keep this in mind
when considering the provincial data that follow.
Tables 5A and 5B include provincial GDP and population information alongside financial
indicators for the 181 provincial Crown corporations aggregated by province. Table 6 reports,
for some of these indicators, each province’s share in the total for all provincial Crown
corporations. Data on the individual corporations that make up the aggregates, including the
specific designation(s) that these entities use to identify themselves, are available on The
School of Public Policy web site at http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/research-
data.
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TABLE 5A. PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS, ALL INDUSTRIES (IN $MILLIONS, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED)
TABLE 5B. PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS, ALL INDUSTRIES (CONT.)
*   From CANSIM.
** Full-time equivalent.
Provincial Crown corporations in Canada hold $554.5 billion in assets, 43.6 per cent more than
federal enterprises, while their liabilities are $361.0 billion, resulting in aggregate net assets of
$191.9 billion. This compares with the more modest aggregate net-asset position of the federal
government of about $32 billion. Provincial corporations also generate $123.3 billion in
revenues, which is more than four times higher than aggregate revenue for the federal Crown
corporations. The 181 provincial Crown corporations also generate a positive net income
before public funding of $18.6 billion, which is a substantial improvement compared to the
negative federal net income, at -$1.7 billion. The total amount of public funding that provincial
Crown corporations receive is $6.4 billion, slightly less than the federal amount of $7.1 billion.
On the whole, therefore, it is evident that provincial government enterprises are more
financially viable than their federal counterparts. As will be discussed below, this is in large
part due to the sectors that they operate in.
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NL 28,192 511,281 4,593 3,181 1,412 1,199 1,198 1 
PE 5,010 143,395 931 858 73 243 276 (33)
NS 36,352 944,810 5,049 5,524 (475) 1,799 1,612 187 
NB 29,448 752,838 14,737 14,311 426 2,976 2,902 74 
QC 319,348 7,905,679 295,490 120,454 175,036 29,522 21,021 8,501 
ON 612,494 13,227,791 92,314 100,989 (8,675) 31,525 27,029 4,496 
MB 54,257 1,234,535 21,422 17,671 3,752 4,920 3,959 961 
SK 63,557 1,044,028 12,937 7,292 3,998 6,131 5,761 370 
AB 263,537 3,720,928 41,923 38,573 3,350 27,971 25,481 2,490 
BC 203,147 4,529,674 65,112 52,112 13,000 17,019 15,500 1,519 
Total 1,615,342 34,014,959 554,508 360,966 191,895 123,306 104,739 18,567 
Prov GDP* Population* Assets Liabilities Net Revenue Expenses Net
(2010) (2010; units) Assets Income
NL 224 225 3,589 581 2.1% 8,983 
PE 86 53 -  203 4.1% 6,490 
NS 165 353 436 431 1.2% 5,344 
NB 342 416 -  843 2.9% 19,576 
QC 2,898 11,399 41,386 16,709 5.2% 37,377 
ON 665 5,162 39,670 11,712 1.9% 6,979 
MB 183 1,145 -  1,787 3.3% 17,352 
SK 409 778 12,882 2,551 4.0% 12,391 
AB 224 2,713 6,645 3,752 1.4% 11,267 
BC 1,193 2,736 -  5,088 2.5% 14,375  
Total 6,388 24,980 104,608 43,658 2.7% 16,302  
Prov Public Comprehensive Employment** GDP GDP Assets per
Funding Income (units) contribution contribution (%) capita ($)
Even though we only have a partial employment figure for the provincial Crown-corporation
sector, it still exceeds federal employment, with more than 104,000 people employed at the
provincial level versus fewer than 90,000 at federal level. 
Not surprisingly, provincial Crown corporations account for a substantially larger share of
Canadian GDP than federal enterprises: more than $43 billion (2.7 per cent of Canadian GDP),
according to our estimations, for the provincial sector, versus $11.8 billion (0.7 per cent of
GDP) for the federal sector.
Figure 1 illustrates the relative size of the federal and provincial state-owned enterprise sector
with regard to the main balance-sheet, financial and economic indicators. 
FIGURE 1. BALANCE SHEET AND FINANCIAL RESULTS: FEDERAL VS. PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS
In terms of inter-provincial comparisons, a potentially interesting issue concerns the
contribution of provincial Crown corporations to net provincial debt accumulated from all
government operations. As shown in Table 5A, for most of the provinces, the Crown sector
actually generates positive aggregate net assets. Thus, for most provinces, the Crown sector
alleviates the net debt accumulated due to other government activities. The notable exception is
Ontario, where the Crown sector generates negative net assets in excess of $8.6 billion. Thus,
for Ontario the province’s debt situation — which many consider to be problematic — is
aggravated by the Crown sector. Another notable case is Quebec, which has by far the largest
positive net asset position of over $175 billion. In this case, the Crown sector makes a
significant contribution to the reduction in the province’s net debt. Despite this contribution,
net provincial debt in Quebec is the second-highest in Canada.17
17 According the most recent Federal Fiscal Reference Tables, net debt by province in 2010-11 was ($millions): BC
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Table 6 illustrates each province’s share, in total, for the main economic and financial
indicators reported in Table 5. Quebec, with 23 per cent of the Canadian population and 20 per
cent of Canadian GDP, leads the way with the largest Crown corporate sector along almost all
dimensions. Combined gross assets in Quebec are $295.5 billion (53.3 per cent of the total
provincial gross assets), more than three times larger than in Ontario, which takes second place
with $92.3 billion (16.6 per cent of the total). British Columbia and Alberta follow with gross
assets of $65.1 and $41.9 billion, respectively. These four provinces together hold 89.2 per cent
of all the assets owned by provincial Crown corporations. Crown corporation assets per capita
amount to more than $37,000 in Quebec, followed by New Brunswick with $19,600, Manitoba
with $17,300 and British Columbia with $14,400.
TABLE 6. PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL, ALL INDUSTRIES
* Refers to the percentage in total provincial GDP and population, excluding territories.
In terms of revenue,18 however, Ontario’s state-owned enterprises sector exceeds Quebec’s,
with $31.5 billion versus $29.5 billion (25.6 per cent and 23.9 per cent of the total,
respectively), followed very closely by Alberta with $27.9 billion (22.7 per cent of the total),
and British Columbia with $17.0 billion (13.8 per cent).
Two interesting cases are the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. Alberta is traditionally
perceived as a province with perhaps less-than-average government involvement in the
business sector. However, with roughly 11 per cent of Canada’s population, and generating 16
per cent of Canadian GDP, Alberta still has a sizable Crown corporation sector in terms of
revenue (22.7 per cent of total revenue by all provincial Crown corporations) and expenses
(24.3 per cent of total),19 although not necessarily in terms of assets (7.6 per cent of gross
assets of all provincial Crown corporations). On the other hand, Saskatchewan is traditionally
perceived as a province with more-than-average government presence in the marketplace.
Saskatchewan has slightly more than three per cent of Canada’s population and generates
roughly four per cent of Canada’s GDP. Yet, its Crown-corporation sector only holds 2.3 per
cent of the gross assets of all provincial Crown corporations and generates five per cent of total
provincial Crown-corporation revenue. It also benefits from 6.4 per cent of total public funding
for all provincial Crown corporations, and generates more than 12 per cent of employment.
18 We report revenue and expenses from operations as well as financial activities.
19 This does not include the municipal Crown power corporations of ENMAX and EPCOR. 
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NL 1.7% 1.5% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 0.0% 3.5% 3.4%
PE 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% -0.2% 1.3% 0.0%
NS 2.3% 2.8% 0.9% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 2.6% 0.4%
NB 1.8% 2.2% 2.7% 4.0% 2.4% 2.8% 0.4% 5.3% 0.0%
QC 19.8% 23.2% 53.3% 33.4% 23.9% 20.1% 45.8% 45.4% 39.6%
ON 37.9% 38.9% 16.6% 28.0% 25.6% 25.8% 24.2% 10.4% 37.9%
MB 3.4% 3.6% 3.9% 4.9% 4.0% 3.8% 5.2% 2.9% 0.0%
SK 3.9% 3.1% 2.3% 2.0% 5.0% 5.5% 2.0% 6.4% 12.3%
AB 16.3% 10.9% 7.6% 10.7% 22.7% 24.3% 13.4% 3.5% 6.4%
BC 12.6% 13.3% 11.7% 14.4% 13.8% 14.8% 8.2% 18.7% 0.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Prov GDP* Population* Assets Liabilities Revenue Expenses Net Public Empl.
Income Funding
Compared to the aggregate numbers for GBEs reported by CANSIM and summarized in Table
2, where total assets for all Canadian GBEs at the provincial/territorial level equal $287.4
billion, total gross assets for the provincial Crown corporations identified in our database are
almost twice as large, at $554.5 billion.20 It is also worth noting that only 118 of the 181
provincial Crown corporations pass the criterion used by Statistics Canada for a government
business enterprise — that 50 per cent or more of their revenue comes from market activities
for the fiscal year we have analyzed. The combined gross assets for this group are $533.3
billion.
Despite our list of Crown corporations being more inclusive than the GBEs considered by
Statistics Canada, the aggregate comprehensive income for all provincial Crown corporations
in Table 5B is not much larger than for the GBEs aggregated in Table 2 above: $18.4 billion in
CANSIM data versus $25.0 billion in our database. CANSIM only considers as GBEs what
might be thought of as economically viable state-owned enterprises, while we include all state-
owned corporations, regardless of their financial position. As such, even though the additional
corporations in our list account for a significant increase in total assets, they generally do not
generate much in the way of income.
6. SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION
Table 7 presents the distribution of the 181 provincial Crown corporations across nine sectors
of activity: culture (CULT);21 economic development (ED);22 finance (F);23 gaming and liquor
(GL); power, electricity, and utilities (PEU); real estate (RE);24 research and innovation (RI);
transportation (T); and others (O).
20 In addition, Table 2 includes territories alongside provinces, while Table 5A only reflects provincial data.
21 All cultural institutions, such as museums, media corporations, heritage foundations, etc.
22 We include here all Crown corporations that promote directly the economic activity within a province or Canada,
such as regional-development corporations, tourism-promotion corporations, etc.
23 Includes banks, insurance companies, WCBs and pension corporations, but also agriculture and municipal financing,
immigrant investment funds, etc.
24 Housing corporations, capital commissions, etc.
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TABLE 7. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS BY SECTOR (IN $MILLIONS, UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED)
The financial sector is by far the largest in terms of balance-sheet items, with gross assets of
$665.1 billion (70.7 per cent of the total), liabilities of $510.9 billion (71.5 per cent), and
therefore net assets of $154.2 billion (68.8 per cent of the total), and also has the largest
number of corporations at 57. However, the 18 provincial gaming and liquor
corporations/commissions dominate the financial results with revenues of $52.0 billion (34.2
per cent of the total), expenses of $40.6 billion (30.1 per cent of the total), and net income of
$11.4 billion (67.7 per cent of the total). The power/electricity/utilities sector has the largest
number of employees with more than 111,000 full-time employees (57.2 per cent of total),25
and also the largest GDP contribution at $18.3 billion (33 per cent of the total).
Perhaps surprisingly, despite being the only province where liquor sales are not a state
monopoly, Alberta has the second-highest net income from the gaming and liquor sector ($2.1
billion) due to the lucrative gaming component. As expected, Ontario has the highest net
income in this sector ($3.2 billion), with a population almost four times as large as Alberta’s.
Gaming and liquor is the only sector that does not benefit from public funding. At the other
end of the spectrum, the three largest recipients of public funding are the financial sector
($4.9 billion), culture ($2.0 billion, of which CBC receives more than half), and transportation
($2.0 billion), amounting to 66.2 per cent of total public funding, followed closely by the real-
estate sector and the ‘other’ sector, with close to $1.5 billion in public funding each.
The following charts show in more detail the relative size of these sectors across the various
balance-sheet and financial indicators discussed in this paper.
25 However, as explained previously, our employment numbers are far from being complete.
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CULT Fed 10 2,971 2,628 647 2,414 1,685 (82) 8,970 1,687 
Prov 17 1,658 1,583 199 548 351 3 2,187 196 
ED Fed 4 49,664 38,297 2,641 1,236 119 1,524 3,186 2,183 
Prov 8 3,094 2,467 23 342 333 15 -  18 
F Fed 4 315,386 300,759 12,820 13,372 3,155 1,949 3,737 894 
Prov 53 349,747 210,152 31,751 25,522 1,731 7,960 17,148 12,251 
GL Fed 0 -  -   -   -   -  -   -   -  
Prov 18 8,130 4,901 51,977 40,584 - 11,393 27,029 14,294 
O Fed 13 7,461 1,603 3,752 3,473 613 879 2,946 1,581 
Prov 25 2,636 1,561 1,663 2,287 819 195 7,204 1,247 
PEU Fed 2 7,151 8,694 7,906 8,330 700 204 65,083 4,829 
Prov 14 160,776 117,302 34,162 29,309 5 4,858 46,171 13,483 
RE Fed 4 1,372 707 250 337 125 26 1,028 126 
Prov 22 10,642 9,069 1,540 2,895 1,389 34 2,738 595 
RI Fed 2 94 76 40 213 177 4 491 62 
Prov 12 1,213 1,073 115 360 258 12 - 86 
T Fed 5 2,077 828 457 877 489 65 4,369 390 
Prov 12 16,611 12,859 1,875 2,893 1,503 510 2,131 1,489 
Total 225 940,684 714,557 151,819 134,990 13,451 29,548 194,418 55,409 
Units Assets Liabilities Revenue Expenses Public Compr. Empl. GDP
Funding Income (pers.) contrib. 
FIGURE 2. BALANCE-SHEET AND FINANCIAL RESULTS BY SECTOR
FIGURE 3. BALANCE SHEET — LARGE SECTORS ($MILLIONS)













































































RI CULT GL O RE T
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FIGURE 5. FINANCIAL RESULTS — LARGE SECTORS ($MILLIONS)
FIGURE 6. FINANCIAL RESULTS — SMALL SECTORS ($MILLIONS)
7. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Many Crown corporations at both the provincial and federal level have been privatized since
the beginning of the ’80s, and in particular between the mid-’80s and mid-’90s.26 Boardman
and Vining27 review the privatization process in Canada and its welfare effects, and make some
general recommendations for future privatizations. They note that while most of the “low-
hanging fruit” at the federal level has been picked, there is still considerable potential for
privatization at the provincial level.
26 According to Boardman and Vining (2012), the 10 largest privatized Crown corporations in terms of proceeds have
been: Petro-Canada (1991, $5.69 billion in proceeds); Canadian National Railway (1995, $2.08 billion); Alberta
Government Telephones (1990, $1.77 billion); Cameco (1991, $1.53 billion for the federal and provincial share);
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (1989, $1.24 billion); Manitoba Telephone Systems (1997, $860 million); Nova
Scotia Power Corp. (1992, $816 million); Air Canada (1988, $708 million); Teleglobe Canada (1987, $612 million);
Syncrude Canada (1993, $502 million). 
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RI CULT O RE T ED
In the first instance, the most likely contenders for privatization in terms of their economic
viability would appear to be Crown corporations with positive net income and net assets; in
particular, those that operate in competitive environments. At the provincial level, these are
generally gaming and liquor corporations, financial enterprises and power/utility companies.
Table 8 presents the largest provincial Crown corporations in terms of net income that might be
considered, using this metric, as potential candidates for privatization. 
TABLE 8. TOP 15 PROVINCIAL CROWN CORPORATIONS BY NET INCOME
Five of these corporations are from Ontario, four are from Quebec, three from British
Columbia and one each from Alberta28, Manitoba and Saskatchewan. By far the largest Crown
corporation in terms of assets, net assets and net income is Caisse de dépôt et placement du
Québec, with a net income of more than $6 billion in 2010, followed at considerable distance
by Hydro-Québec, with a net income of $2.5 billion. The third-largest Crown corporation in
terms of net income is the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission, with a substantial net
income of more than $2.1 billion in 2010.
The top 15 federal Crown corporations in terms of net income are listed in Table 9.
28 Again, this does not include ENMAX and EPCOR.
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Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 183,197.0 31,455.0 151,742.0 6,432.0 291.0 6,141.0 
Hydro-Québec 65,898.0 47,332.0 18,566.0 12,338.0 9,823.0 2,515.0 
Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission 584.3 584.3 -  24,947.4 22,826.8 2,120.6 
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation 3,381.9 831.5 2,550.4 6,347.6 4,628.9 1,718.7 
Liquor Control Board of Ontario 894.1 514.3 379.8 4,344.1 2,908.5 1,435.6 
Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation 15,087.0 29,897.0 (14,810.0) 4,577.0 3,205.0 1,372.0 
Loto-Québec (including the Société 1,216.6 1,082.1 134.5 3,674.9 2,336.9 1,337.9
des casinos du Québec) 
British Columbia Lottery Corporation 325.4 325.4 -  2,679.9 1,575.3 1,104.6 
Société des alcools du Québec 641.0 596.2 44.8 2,716.3 1,801.6 914.7 
British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch 166.1 166.1 -  2,831.7 1,941.3 890.4 
Hydro One Inc. (ON) 17,322.0 11,341.0 5,981.0 5,124.0 4,477.0 647.0 
British Columbia Hydro and Power 19,479.0 16,599.0 2,880.0 4,016.0 3,427.0 589.0
Authority (BC Hydro) 
Ontario Power Generation 29,577.0 21,492.0 8,085.0 5,375.0 4,786.0 589.0 
Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority 162.9 168.0 (5.1) 1,004.6 562.1 442.5 
Manitoba Lotteries Corporation 203.4 198.4 5.0 767.6 396.6 371.0 
Corporation Assets Liabilities Net Revenue Expenses Net 
Assets Income
TABLE 9. TOP 15 FEDERAL CROWN CORPORATIONS BY NET INCOME
At the other end of the spectrum, there are a considerable number of Crown corporations that
are not viable from this perspective and depend on public funding for their survival. Table 10
presents the bottom 15 Crown corporations in terms of net income at both the federal and
provincial level.
Even though these corporations are not self-sustaining today, it is of course possible that
private ownership may result in increased efficiency and productivity. Moreover, parts of
government enterprises that do not, on aggregate, generate positive net income, could be
considered for privatization; an example of this is the privatization of AECL’s commercial
division. 
TABLE 10. BOTTOM 15 CROWN CORPORATIONS BY NET INCOME
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Export Development Canada 31,872.0 23,771.0 8,101.0 2,020.0 489.0 1,531.0 
Canada Development Investment Corporation 5,584.9 105.7 5,479.2 923.1 107.3 815.8 
Canada Post Corporation 6,029.0 4,213.0 1,787.0 7,312.0 6,955.0 357.0 
Farm Credit Canada 20,203.1 17,867.6 2,335.6 829.5 547.6 281.9 
Royal Canadian Mint 339.4 100.7 238.7 2,209.1 2,162.6 46.5 
Canada Lands Company Limited 538.2 242.8 295.4 183.2 143.7 39.5 
Ridley Terminals Inc. 60.6 7.0 53.6 61.6 30.4 31.2 
Defence Construction (1951) Limited 36.4 23.2 13.2 89.7 83.4 6.3 
Business Development Bank of Canada 17,679.9 14,036.9 3,643.0 572.7 566.7 6.1 
Laurentian Pilotage Authority 22.7 10.5 12.3 69.2 64.1 5.2 
Pacific Pilotage Authority 27.0 10.5 16.5 59.2 56.0 3.2 
Blue Water Bridge Authority 194.4 107.6 86.8 21.3 18.8 2.5 
Canadian Race Relations Foundation 23.7 0.1 23.6 3.3 0.9 2.5 
Atlantic Pilotage Authority 14.3 7.1 7.2 21.6 19.2 2.4 
Great Lakes Pilotage Authority 4.7 8.1 (3.4) 20.1 18.0 2.0 
Corporation Assets Liabilities Net Revenue Expenses Net 
Assets Income
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1,580.0 1,717.8 138.1 567.7 1,790.3 (1,222.6) 1,142.7 
Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 1,122.0 4,480.6 (3,358.6) 594.4 1,374.7 (780.3) 700.4 
La Financière agricole du Québec 844.3 1,431.5 (587.2) 20.9 798.3 (777.4) 776.8 
Canada Mortgage and Housing  293,218.0 281,783.0 11,435.0 11,761.0 12,494.0 (733.0) 3,155.0
Corporation
Société d’habitation du Québec 557.4 557.4 -  2.4 730.7 (728.3) 728.3 
Community Living British Columbia 37.2 33.5 3.7 12.2 695.3 (683.1) 683.4 
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board 16,638.0 28,993.0 (12,355.0) 4,877.0 5,552.0 (675.0) - 
(ON) 
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 568.1 543.7 24.4 3.2 576.9 (573.7) 580.4 
BC Transportation Financing Authority 9,979.4 8,538.2 1,441.1 385.8 821.0 (435.2) 142.6 
Saskatchewan Crop Insurance 654.6 304.2 350.4 150.3 533.8 (383.5) 246.0
Corporation 
Société de transport de Montréal 3,971.6 1,918.0 2,053.6 526.5 845.3 (318.8) 921.1 
VIA Rail Canada Inc. 1,313.8 304.1 257.8 277.9 570.0 (292.1) 318.6 
Metrolinx 4,282.8 3,457.4 825.4 309.0 561.5 (252.6) 240.2 
Regional Development Corporation (NB) 63.0 41.9 21.2 -  222.8 (222.8) 224.4 
Canada Council for the Arts 295.59 34.12 261.47 11.08 194.23 -183.14 183.12
Corporation Assets Liabilities Net Revenue Expenses Net Public
Assets Income Funding
Obviously, not all of these corporations can, or should, be privatized. For a true assessment of
the opportunity for privatization, each case should be considered individually.
One issue that can be an important determinant in the decision to privatize is the distribution of
corporate taxes paid by a privatized entity between the federal and provincial governments.
For example, in the case of a provincial Crown corporation all of the profits are received by the
provincial government.  If the entity is privatized, any subsequent corporate taxes will be split
between the federal and provincial governments.  This can be an impediment to privatization,
even if potential efficiencies are substantial.
8. MUNICIPAL CROWN CORPORATIONS 
Our original intention was to collect data for Crown corporations at the municipal level as well.
This proved to be a very difficult task and one that has not come to fruition. There are
thousands of municipalities and districts across the country and it would be a monumental
exercise to analyze the annual report of each municipality in order to identify the municipal
Crown corporations. 
An alternative approach would be to focus on the annual reports of Canada’s largest cities with
a view to identifying the largest municipal Crown corporations. However this approach also
proved to be problematic for two reasons: (1) the confusing terminology used to identify
potential Crown corporations; and (2) the overlapping jurisdictions of many localities. To
illustrate these issues, we present later in this section two case studies, for the municipalities of
Calgary and Vancouver. 
A third approach would be to start with specific sectors where one would expect services to be
delivered, at least in part, by public-owned entities: water and sewage, waste disposal, public
transit, electricity and gas distribution, affordable housing, etc. Statistics Canada collects data
for these companies to produce its own municipal GBE statistics.29 However, a compilation of
the specific corporations in each of these sectors is not readily available. Moreover, some of
the entities in these areas are not necessarily organized as corporations. For example, Calgary
Transit is organized as a business unit of the City of Calgary.30
A fourth approach is to check the provincial municipal-affairs departments as well as the
annual reports of the provincial-municipal finance corporations for information about
municipal-government business enterprises. The information we found in each case was, at
best, incomplete. Typically, municipal Crown corporations only show up in such documents to
the extent that they have contracted loans from the municipal-finance corporation in that
particular fiscal year. 
29 Statistics Canada, “Finances of the Government Business Enterprises,” available at
http://www23.statcan.gc.ca:81/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=1730&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2
30 Calgary Transit, “About Calgary Transit,” accessed April 28, 2012,
http://www.calgarytransit.com/html/organisation.html.
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So how many municipal Crown corporations are there in Canada? Certainly hundreds. In the
case of British Columbia, for example, the Local Government Infrastructure and Finance
division of the Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development publishes a list of
municipal corporations “that have received Inspector approval and have been registered with
the Registrar of Companies.”31 There are 72 such corporations listed in 2010, which operate in
the following areas: forestry enterprise (26); economic development (14); land development
(9); local government service (6); housing (3); municipal utility (2); other (12). 
Some of these corporations are owned by municipalities of the Greater Vancouver Regional
District (Metro Vancouver)32 and can be found in the annual reports of those municipalities.33
But in addition to the annual report of each individual municipality, Metro Vancouver publishes
its own financial reports. The “Consolidated Financial Statements of Greater Vancouver
Regional District” for 2010 lists four additional entities: the Greater Vancouver Regional
District (GVRD), the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District (GVS&DD), the
Greater Vancouver Water District (GVWD), and the Metro Vancouver Housing Corporation
(MVHC). Although these districts provide services to the member municipalities, they do not
fit the profile of “Crown corporations” as, unlike the arrangement for corporations, page 11
explains that the member municipalities are “jointly and severally liable” for the debts incurred
by the districts. However, MVHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of GVRD and is “incorporated
under the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia) for the purpose of supplying
affordable rental accommodation” and it can, therefore, be considered a Crown corporation.
Interestingly, none of the 72 municipal corporations mentioned above belongs to the City of
Vancouver proper. Instead, page 14 of the City of Vancouver’s 2010 annual report lists six
other “City controlled corporations”: Hastings Institute Inc., Harbour Park Development Inc.,
the Parking Corporation of Vancouver, the Vancouver Civic Development Corporation, the City
of Vancouver Public Housing Corporation and the Pacific National Exhibition. An additional
four organizations are listed as managing assets owned by the City of Vancouver: the
Vancouver Art Gallery Society, the Vancouver Museum, the H.R. MacMillan Space Centre, and
the Vancouver Maritime Museum.
So, in addition to the 72 municipal corporations listed by B.C.’s Ministry of Community, Sport
and Cultural Development, there are many other Crown corporations or other types of
government entities providing services in some of the municipalities in B.C. 
31 British Columbia Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development, Local Government Infrastructure and
Finance, “Local Government Corporations,” accessed March 10, 2012,
http://www.cscd.gov.bc.ca/lgd/infra/local_government_corporations.htm.
32 Coquitlam Optical Network Corporation, Pitt Meadows Economic Development Corporation, Richmond Oval,
Surrey City Development Corporation, etc.
33 For example, Lonsdale Energy Corp. is included in “The City of North Vancouver 2010 Annual Municipal Report”
on page 33.
25
We have found a similar situation for the City of Calgary. The City of Calgary’s 2009 annual
report mentions two government business enterprises: ENMAX and the Calgary Telus
Convention Centre. The 2010 annual report lists only ENMAX as a government business
enterprise, while the Calgary Telus Convention Centre is included in a list of six “related
authorities,” alongside the Calgary Parking Authority, the Calgary Public Library Board,
Calhome Properties Ltd. (operating as the Calgary Housing Company), the Calgary Municipal
Land Corporation, and the Attainable Homes Calgary Corporation.34 While it comes as no
surprise that ENMAX is a profitable enterprise (it had a net income of $178 million in 2010),
Attainable Homes Calgary Corporation, the Calgary Parking Authority and the Calgary
Municipal Land Corporation also achieved positive net incomes from operations in 2010 of
$1.2 million, $27.7 million and $3.4 million respectively. 
In addition to the government business enterprises and related authorities listed above, the City
of Calgary also has 29 business units,35 the largest of them being Calgary Transit, along with
Assessment, Infrastructure and Information Services, The City of Calgary Water Services
Department, etc.
9. CONCLUSION
There is very little research documenting the size of the government-owned enterprise sector in
Canada. The few studies that exist focus on federal Crown corporations, for which data are
relatively easily accessible.
In addition to the 47 federal Crown corporations, we developed a database of 181 provincial
Crown corporations and compared their financial results to their federal counterparts. We find
that while the provincial sector is only 43.6 per cent larger than the federal sector in terms of
gross assets, it earns more than four times the revenue of the federal Crown corporations,
generates substantially more in terms of net income, and hires more people. We also estimate
that the provincial Crown-corporation sector contributed more than $43 billion to Canadian
GDP in 2010, about 2.7 per cent of GDP, versus the federal contribution of roughly $11.8
billion, or 0.7 per cent of GDP.
Our aggregate economic and financial indicators for federal and provincial Crown corporations
exceed those published by Statistics Canada for government business enterprises because,
unlike Statistics Canada, which focuses only on entities that have been deemed to be more or
less “self-sufficient,” we include all corporations that we were able to identify as owned by the
federal and provincial governments.
Due to the sheer number of municipalities in Canada and the variety of terms used to denote
Crown corporations within the same province and even within the same municipality, we have
yet to develop a systematic way of identifying municipal Crown corporations. Based on a
preliminary investigation, as well as data published by Statistics Canada, we suspect that there
are hundreds of municipal Crown corporations in Canada. We hope to be able to compile data
at the municipal level at some point in the future. 
34 Also designated as “an independent non-profit corporation” on page 37 of the report.
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